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Islamic Microfinance:  
The Challenge of Institutional Diversity
1 
 





Forays into Islamic microfinance have been few and scattered and of limited outreach. 
Some have been mandated by the state, but lack popular demand, as in Iran; other have 
emerged in response to popular demand, but lack regulatory support by the state, as in 
Syria. This has provided the background for a more systematic study of Islamic 
microfinance in Indonesia, the largest Muslim country, where several strands of Islamic 
microfinance, formal and semiformal, have evolved since 1990 in parallel. Islamic 
banking is now officially recognized as part of a dual banking system in Indonesia. 
Lacking broad popular demand, experience differs by sub-sector: Only commercial 
banks have successfully acquired the art of Islamic banking by training young and 
dynamic people, yet lack experience in microfinance. Islamic rural banks, mostly under 
absentee ownership, have failed to prove themselves as efficient and dynamic providers 
of microfinance services. Unsupervised Islamic, like conventional, cooperatives are an 
outright menace to their members, who risk loosing their savings. There are two options 
of promoting Islamic microfinance: (1) Assisting Islamic commercial banks to establish 
units with Islamic microfinance products; (2) reassessing in a participatory process the 
challenges and realistic opportunities of Islamic rural banks and cooperatives, with a 
focus on effective internal control, external supervision, and the establishment of 
associations with apex services to their member institutions. 
 
                                                 
1 Revised version of a paper presented during a Symposium on Islamic Micro-Finance at the 
Harvard Law School, 14 April 2007.    2
 
Discovering Islamic microfinance… 
Islamic finance has boomed in recent years; but what has hit the headlines is big money 
that is moved around along the principles of Islamic law. Since the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh and its founder, Prof. Muhammad Yunus, received the Peace Nobel Price 
last year, microcredit and microsavings have been widely discussed as instruments of 
poverty alleviation and local development. But has anyone heard of Islamic microfinance 
in this context, the collection of small savings and the provision of small loans based on 
Shariah? Yes, some references will be found in Google. 
 
…in Sudan 
My first encounter with Islamic finance and microcredit, or rather the lack thereof, dates 
back to 1983 in Sudan while I was doing a feasibility study for a small enterprise project. 
I found numerous small enterprises, some of remarkable ingenuity in solving their 
technical problems in a difficult environment, but all facing one core problem: lack of 
access to credit. Then I visited a bank, to find out whether they did, or why they did not, 
lend to small entrepreneurs. The bank’s hallway was full of tractors, threshers and other 
machinery. The bank offered two main products. One was mudarabah: the bank 
carefully selected highly profitable large enterprises, invested in them and shared the 
profit, gaining in some cases up to 80% during the first year. The other one was 
murabahah: the bank bought machinery and sold it to its customers, to be (re-) paid in 
instalments with a fixed mark-up, not much different from conventional credit. The bank 
did very well, defaults were negligible; any type of speculative lending would have been 
against Islamic law. Then there was qard al-hasan, a form of charitable microcredit 
without any profit-sharing or mark-up and the only type of unsecured lending permitted 
under Shariah. This represented only an insignificant proportion of the bank’s portfolio 
and reached but a small number of clients. My target group, the small entrepreneurs, fell 
between the categories: too small for mudarabah and murabahah, too big, and too 
many, for qard al-hasan. To avoid the wrath of my colleagues in Sudan I should add that 
their banks have changed a lot since 1983.
2  
 
… in Syria 
My next unintended exposure to Islamic microfinance started in 1998 when I was asked 
to design a credit program for Jabal al-Hoss, one of the poorest rural areas in Syria. Of 
all the banks, state-owned, only the agricultural bank could possibly offer such services, 
but was very short of staff and thus deemed unsuitable to deal with large numbers of 
small farmers. After extensive discussions with men and women in various villages, we 
came up with a proposal that contrasted sharply with state-owned conventional banking: 
establishing locally owned microfinance institutions; linking them, terminologically, to an 
ancient Arab institution, sanduq (pl.: sandadiq), a village fund with some resemblance to 
a rabobank or sparbank as they would be called in the Netherlands, or a Raiffeisenkasse 
or Sparkasse in Germany; initial resource mobilization through shares acquired by men 
and women in the village on a voluntary basis; and insistence on Islamic principles, most 
strongly expressed by the women – demand-driven!. The financial product agreed upon 
was murabahah; for instance, the sanduq would buy 10 sheep and sell them to a 
member, to be repaid in instalments with a fixed mark-up. At the end of the year the 
profit made by a sanduq would be shared between the members and the sanduq as a 
source of growth. Once financial operations were satisfactory, the sanadiq had access to 
refinancing from a sanduq markazi, or central fund. This was initially replenished by 
                                                 
2 Studies are available from NENARACA@nets.com.jo , a regional association of agricultural 
banks (http://www.fao.org/ag/ags/agsm/Banks/associat/nenaraca.htm).   3
UNDP and subsequently by the Japanese Government. As of June 2006 there were 32 
village-based sanadiq with 7360 shareholders, 47% of them women. The sanduq 
approach to microfinance is of great promise as a model of self-managed development 
from below and sustainable poverty alleviation. But so far neither the Syrian government 
nor any donors other than the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 




… in Iran 
Next were studies in Iran, between 2001 and 2004, where Islamic finance is mandatory. 
Both deposit and lending rates are fixed by the government, below market rates: a 
practice known among development theorists as financial repression. What are the 
results? Let’s have a look at the major government bank dealing with small clients. In 
2003-04 the bank had about 2.5 million borrowers and 16.6 million deposit accounts 
(including current accounts). 2.7% of loans outstanding and 46% of deposit balances 
were unremunerated qard al-hasan: a big discrepancy between qard assets and 
liabilities. The depositors were attracted to the qard accounts by religious motives and by 
prizes at semi-annual draws, valued at 2% of deposits: very unwisely in economic terms. 
Inflation imposes a so-called inflation tax, to the benefit of the state. The biggest losers 
are the depositors. During the mid-1990s when inflation rates were around 50%, 
depositors lost about half the value of their deposits every single year. In 2003-04 the 
inflation rate had dropped to 16%, which means that depositors still lost the equivalent of 
14% of the value of their deposits. Accordingly, the state cashed in on what I would call 
the usurious inflation tax – very much in contrast to fairness and brotherhood as 
principles of Islamic banking. Religious authorities seem unconcerned. But on the 
lending side, aren’t low profit-sharing rates beneficial to farmers, microentrepreneurs and 
the poor? Unfortunately, experience has shown that they are not. The scarce resources 
flow disproportionately into the pockets of big borrowers, at the expense of small farmers 
and microentrepreneurs. It is thus not surprising that microfinance institutions and 
programs are few and insignificant in Iran: a challenge to those in government who are 
in charge of shariah banking and finance! 
 
Tentative conclusion 
Forays into Islamic microfinance have been few and scattered and of limited outreach. 
Some have been mandated by the state, but lack popular demand; other have emerged 
in response to popular demand, but lack regulatory support by the state. This has 
provided the background for a more systematic study of Islamic microfinance in 
Indonesia, the largest Muslim country, where several strands of Islamic microfinance 
have recently evolved in parallel. 
                                                 
3 See Omar Imady & H.D. Seibel, Sanduq: A Microfinance Innovation in Jabal Al Hoss, Syria. 
Working Paper 2003-1 in www.uni-koeln.de/ew-fak/aef/; Nashwa Abdulkarim, Rural Community 
Development Project in Jabal al-Hoss, European Microfinance Week 2006, www.microfinance-
platform.eu ; http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/38383_file_23.ppt .   4
Origins of Islamic finance in Indonesia
4 
Indonesia is probably the country with the greatest diversity of both conventional and 
Islamic microfinance, the former evolving over a period of over one hundred years, the 
latter over a period of fifteen years. Indonesia possesses one of the most differentiated 
microfinance infrastructures in the developing world, comprising some 6,000 formal and 
48,000 semiformal registered microfinance units serving about 45 million depositors and 
32 million borrowers; 800,000 channeling groups; and millions of informal financial 
institutions and self-help groups. There is hardly an institutional type of microfinance that 
is not found in Indonesia. 
 
Islamic finance in Indonesia has evolved since around 1990, mainly in response to 
political demands from Muslim scholars and organizations. The first Islamic cooperatives 
were established in 1990, followed by rural banks in 1991 and an Islamic commercial 
bank (ICB) in 1992. In 1998, Bank Indonesia gave official recognition, as part of a new 
banking act, to the existence of a dual banking system, conventional and Islamic. Until 
December 2005, this led to the establishment of two additional ICBs and 19 Islamic 
commercial banking units (ISBU) (out of a total of 138 commercial banks), with a 
continuing upward trend. The growth pattern of Islamic rural banks has been quite 
different. After an initial period of growth until 1996 when they reached a total of 71, their 
number almost stagnated after the Asian financial crisis, reaching 78 by 1998, a mere 84 
by 2003 (out of a total of 2134 rural banks) and 92 by Dec. 2005. Rapid expansion of 
Islamic financial cooperatives started after 1996, as a result of promotion by PINBUK, an 
NGO, and continued throughout the financial crisis, but stagnated after 1999 at around 
3000 and declined to less than 2,900 as of 2003 (out of a total of some 40,000 financial 
cooperatives).  
 
Table 1: Growth of Islamic banking, 1991-2005 
Type of Islamic bank  1991  1992  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Commercial banks (CB)  0  1  2  2  2  2  2  3  3 
CB units  0  0  1  3  3  6  8  15  19 
Total  CB offices  0  1  40  62  96  127  299  401  504 
Rural banks  4  9  78  78  81  83  84  86  92 
Total number of banks  4  10  81  83  86  91  94  104  114 
Total number of offices  4  10  118  140  177  210  383  487  596 
 
Islamic commercial banks 
The market leaders in Islamic finance in Indonesia are the commercial banks. During the 
reporting period, 1991-2003, they focused on medium- and large-scale finance. As of 
2003, they accounted for a mere 0.74% of total assets of the banking sector. However, 
during 2001-2003 their share had increased from 0.17% to 0.74% and stood at 2.19% in 
Dec 2005.  
 
Table 2: Islamic vs. conventional commercial banks, Dec. 2003 
  Islamic   Conventional   Total 
Date of origin of first bank  1992  1895   
Total number of banks/banking units  10  136  138 + 8 units 
Total number of banking offices 
     Including BRI units: 




Total banking assets  0.74%  99.36%  100.0% 
Total loans outstanding  1.16%  88.84%  100.0% 
                                                 
4 Based on field research in Indonesia between 24 May and 5 June 2004, supported by GTZ. For 
a full report see Working Paper 2006-2, www.uni-koeln.de/ew-fak/aef.   5
Total deposits  0.64%  99.36%  100.0% 
Loans-to-deposits ratio (LDR, FDR)  97%  53%  54% 
Improvement in NPLR 2000-2003  13.0% to 2.3%  26.8% to 8.2%  26.8% to 8.2% 
Return on assets  0.65%  2.1%  2.1% 
 
There is remarkable difference in performance between conventional and Islamic 
commercial banks. In relative terms, 
 
•  the Islamic banks lend more of the funds deposited (97%, compared with 54% of the 
total commercial banking sector);  
•  their non-performing loan ratio (NPLR) is persistently lower and has improved faster 
(from 13.0% in 2000 to 2.3% in 2003) than that of conventional banks (from 26.8% to 
8.2%).  
 
Yet, despite the Islamic banks’ better performance in terms of portfolio quality, their 
return on average assets of 0.65% is less than a third of that of the total commercial 
banking sector at 2.12%. This difference is attributed to the rapid increase in the number 
of Islamic banking units, which have only recently started to lend.  
 
However, the growth of Islamic finance is mainly due to an expansion of supply, 
gladly accepted, rather than broad popular demand. When Bank Indonesia, the 
central bank, commissioned surveys in provinces with an average Muslim 
population of 97%, it found that only 11% understood products and benefits of 
Shariah banking. It concluded that,  
 
“There is still a gap between needs and knowledge of shariah financial products and 
services. The gap could delay the success to mobilise potential public fund to investment 
because of low switching rate from potential demand to real demand. Furthermore, the gap 




Islamic rural banks (BPRS) 
Rural banks (BPR) are part of the formal financial sector, based on the law of October 
1988. The initial minimum capital requirement was only $29,000. During the 15-year 
period 1989-2003, the total BPR sector had grown to 2134, comprising 2050 
conventional BPR and 84 BPR-Shariah (BPRS). After a promising start in the early 
1990s, the development of Islamic rural banks has almost come to a standstill. During 
the six-year period, 1991-96, the BPRS grew at an overall average of 12 per year. 
During the two years when the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia, 1997 and 1998, their 
growth slowed down to less than four per year. During the following five years, 1999-
2003, their net growth almost stagnated, averaging one per year: seven  were newly 
established, two were closed at the beginning of 2004.  
 
Despite the fact that they had only two years less than conventional BPR, they have 
attained a mere 4% of the number and 1.5% of the assets of the rural banking sector. 
The average growth rate of the conventional BPR during the 15-year period was 137 
institutions per year – compared to only 6.5 BPRS p.a. during a 13-year period. 
Conventional rural banks have thus grown more than twenty times faster than Islamic 
rural banks per year. Moreover, they are much smaller, and their growth is slower: their 
                                                 
5 Bank Indonesia, The Blueprint of Islamic Banking Development in Indonesia, Jakarta 2002, p. 
10.   6
average assets amount to only 38% of those of conventional BPR; during 2001-2003, 
total assets of the BPRS grew (nominally) by 70%, compared with 173% of the total BPR 
sector.  
 
Table 3: Islamic (BPRS) vs. conventional rural banks (BPR), Dec. 2003 
  Islamic   Conventional   Total 
Date of origin of first rural bank  1991  1989   
Total number of rural banks as of Dec. 2003 















Av. number of rural banks p.a. since origin  6.5  136.7   
Total rural banking assets  1.5%  98.5%  100% 
Size of BPRS in % of average BPR  38%     
Asset growth during 2000-2003  70%  175%  173% 
Total loans outstanding  1.5%  98.5%  100.0% 
Total deposits  1.2%  98.8%  100.0% 
Loans-to-deposits ratio (LDR, FDR)  126%  103%  103% 
Total outreach:  Rural banking sector 








There are several reasons for the poor performance of Islamic microbanks in Indonesia: 
 
•  Governance and management problems: many have been established by absentee 
owners for moral reasons, with an emphasis on social banking, and are managed by 
retired conventional bankers, who lack dynamism and Islamic banking expertise – 
with dire consequences on performance; 
•  inadequate internal control, mostly by absentee commissioners, and a lack of 
external auditing, due to small size below the limit where auditing is required 
•  lack of popular demand for Islamic banking products;  
•  emphasis on the informal sector, to the neglect of more profitable market segments  
•  lack of mastery of overly complex Islamic banking practices.  
 
Islamic financial cooperatives  
The development of Islamic banking has been paralleled by that of Islamic 
financial cooperatives. They evolved in several stages. The first Islamic 
cooperative was established in 1990. After 1995 PINBUK, an NGO,  started 
promoting Islamic cooperatives. There were big jumps in numbers during the 
crisis years 1997 and 1998, followed by a slowing-down, stagnation and decline. 
 
Table 4: The evolution of Islamic cooperatives 
No.  Phase  Period  Number of BMT 
1  Initial growth  1990-1995  300 








3  Slowing-down of growth  2000  2,938 
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In contrast to the rural banks, there is not much difference between conventional and 
Islamic financial cooperatives: both suffer from the same regulatory and supervisory 
neglect. At most one-fifth of Islamic cooperatives is in reasonably good health. The 
majority are dormant or non-performing; most of the remaining ones exist for the 
purpose of receiving funds from the government. The Ministry of Cooperatives does not 
register cooperatives as Islamic or conventional and provides no information on, or 
special assistance to, Islamic cooperatives. But this is no cause for distress: the first step 
to cooperative reform in Indonesia, as in many other developing countries, would be 
closing the Ministry of Cooperatives and eliminating government influence. 
 
Table 5: Islamic vs. conventional cooperatives 
  Islamic   Conventional   Total 
Total number of financial cooperatives 







Total assets  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Total loans outstanding  1.1%  98.9%  100.0% 
Total deposits  2.9%  97.1  100.0% 
Loans-to-deposits ratio (LDR, FDR)  90%  34%  35% 
Non-performing loans ratio (NPLR)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Return on assets  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Total outreach: credit accounts  0.7%  99.3%  100.0 
 
In sum, the outreach of Islamic cooperatives is negligible, their overall performance poor: 
 
§ There is a lack of regulation, supervision and reliable reporting;  
•  the large majority of Islamic cooperatives is dormant or technically bankrupt; 
•  their outreach is negligible, accounting for 7.2% of all financial cooperatives, but 
less than 1% of borrower outreach of the sector; 
•  their loan portfolio (much of it overdue) accounts for 1,1% of the financial 
cooperative sector and 0.19% of the microfinance sector; 
•  the savings of the depositors are at great risk; 
•  overall there is little difference in performance between conventional and Islamic 
cooperatives, the latter having inherited most of their problems from the former; 
§ no remedy is in sight, except in the framework of a total overhaul of the 
cooperative system; 
§ fresh money pumped into the sector without effective regulation and supervision 
will further aggravate their downfall, as has been historically the case of state-
supported cooperative sectors. 
 
Islamic financial products 
Islamic financial products are complicated, unfamiliar to most, and poorly understood by 
many banking staff. Most of the lending is trade financing at a fixed margin (murabahah), 
which is felt to be little different from conventional banking, except that it requires two 
contracts by the bank: one with the seller and one with the borrower to whom the bank 
sells the commodity.  
 
The strength of Islamic finance lies in its conservative character: only real transactions 
with sufficient collateral, but no speculative investments, are financed. This however has 
substantially reduced financings to start-ups and microentrepreneurs without collateral; a 
a major section of a potential microfinance market.     8
 
Table 6: Financial products of Islamic banks (commercial and rural),  
              in percent, 2000 and 2005 
   2000  2005 
Financings:       
Musyarakah  2.6  12.5 
Mudarabah  30.5  20.5 
Murabahah  62.6  62.3 
Istishna  6.0  1.8 
Qardh  0.0  0.8 
Other  0.8  2.1 
   Total financings in %  100.0  100.0 
   Amount in million Rupiah        1,239,423        15,231,942  
Deposits:       
Wadiah  21.5  13.1 
Mudarabah Savings  32.7  28.0 
Mudarabah fixed deposits  45.8  58.8 
   Total deposits in %  100.0  100.0 
   Amount in million Rupiah        1,028,923        15,582,329  
Financing-to-Deposit Ratio, %             123.5                  97.8  
 
Islamic microfinance in Aceh, a special area
6 
Nanggroeh Aceh Darussalam (NAD) is a province with a special status in Indonesia. It 
has been given autonomy in choosing its own legal framework (Qanun) and has 
introduced Islamic law. In the context of massive international aid after the tsunami and 
earthquake and a lasting peace accord after 29 years of secessionist unrest, various 
Indonesian and international agencies, in close cooperation with the reconstruction 
agency BRR and Bank Indonesia, are now focusing on the reconstruction and reform of 
the microbanking and cooperative sectors in Aceh.  
 
In microbanking, the emphasis is on restructuring existing privately owned and local 
government-owned rural banks. In the cooperative sector, a new approach to reform is 
being taken through Islamic cooperatives and Islamic cooperative rural banks, with a 
strong emphasis on self-reliance and effective supervision. Of 1,052 government-
directed financial cooperatives in the province, registered but not effectively regulated 
nor supervised, only 3% were found to be performing reasonably well, while 64% were 
non-performing. In this situation, instead of attempting to reform an ailing conventional 
cooperative sector, it has been decided to establish new savings and credit cooperatives 
and to be strict on the legally required minimum share capital as proof of effective 
ownership. To prevent the failures of the past, GTZ, together with local authorities, PNM 
and other donors, has adopted a comprehensive financial systems approach:  
 
•  In an Islamic province given autonomy in choosing its own legal framework and 
in direct response to popular demand, it was decided to set up Baitul Qirad (BQ), 
??????￿??? , a uniquely Acehnese term for Islamic financial cooperatives;  
•  simultaneously, a support structure of secondary cooperatives (BQ Centers) for 
effective regulation and supervision of the adherence of the primary cooperatives 
to cooperative law, Islamic principles and internal by-laws is being established;  
                                                 
6 Based on various reports to GTZ, 2005 and 2006.   9
•  Islamic cooperative rural banks (BPRS) will be established for liquidity exchange, 
refinancing and larger financings; 
•   the establishment of an independent financial authority for cooperative 
supervision, as well as the establishment of a microfinance apex bank, are under 
discussion.  
 
Islamic cooperative banking software and packages of staff training are provided by 
PNM. GTZ’s support is focused on 15 BQs and two BQ Center at the east coast (in 
addition to support to privately owned rural banks), serving as a model for expansion 
over a province with four million inhabitants, and perhaps in other provinces. There is a 
vast potential for expansion. However, donor inputs in Aceh are limited in time to post-
tsunami emergency aid. There is thus no certainty that a sustainable house of finance 




Islamic microfinance, lacking broad popular demand and Islamic banking expertise, so 
far has been more a political than an economic project in Indonesia. Experience differs 
substantially by sub-sector. Only commercial banks appear to be able of quickly 
acquiring the art of Islamic banking by training young and dynamic people; but most of 
the commercial banks lack experience in microfinance as a specialized field. This may 
change with the recent entry of BRI units and some other banks into Islamic banking. 
Islamic, unlike conventional, rural banks, have failed to prove themselves as efficient 
and dynamic providers of microfinance services. Unsupervised Islamic, like 
conventional, cooperatives are an outright menace to their member-shareholders and 
depositors, who risk loosing their money.  
 
On the basis of the existing experience with Islamic finance in Indonesia, decision-
makers in favor of promoting Islamic financial services are now confronted with two 
major options, which are not necessarily alternatives: 
 
•  Focusing on Islamic commercial banks in Indonesia and assisting them to 
establish branches and units with Islamic microfinance products, following the 
lead of BRI; 
•  re-assessing in a participatory process the challenges and realistic opportunities 
of Islamic rural banks and cooperatives, with a focus on effective internal control, 
external supervision, delegated or auxiliary, and the establishment of 
associations of respective microbanks and cooperatives with apex services to 
their member institutions. 
 
We recommend to decision-makers in Islamic organizations, government agencies and 
donor organizations to cautiously examine the following opportunities for the 
development of a healthy Islamic financial sector in Indonesia: 
 
(1) Commercial banks, in setting up branch networks of Islamic MFIs, may learn, 
with good prospects, from the rich experience of successful microfinance 
strategies and institutions within Indonesia, particularly the Microbanking Division 
of Bank Rakyat Indonesia, one of the most successful microfinance programs in 
the developing world, which has recently started to set up Islamic units.  
 
(2) Islamic rural banks need to be revamped if they are to play a more than 
marginal role in Indonesia. This will require an overall development plan mutually   10
agreed upon by all stakeholders. Some of the more successful Islamic rural 
banks may serve as exposure training sites to future managers. Auditing should 
be mandatory regardless of size.  
 
(3) Islamic cooperatives suffer from much the same set of problems as the whole 
cooperative sector. There is little chance for any intervention to be successful in 
the short run, except in limited areas (such as Aceh). They need a system of 
prudential regulation, mandatory auditing, and effective supervision by an 
appropriate financial authority, which is definitely not the Ministry of Cooperatives 
& SMEs. They should be fully financed through equity and savings deposits of 
members; only healthy and well-supervised cooperatives should be permitted to 
collect deposits from non-members. They need strong associations and 
federations to provide a full range of support services to their members.  
 
(4) Permodalan Nasional Madani (PNM) is a government-owned corporation  with 
independent management, carved out of the central bank after the financial crisis 
of 1997/98, with the mandate of restructuring and strengthening rural banks and 
cooperatives serving micro and small enterprises. With a strong focus on Islamic 
microfinance. It has recapitalized a number of Islamic rural banks and 
cooperatives; it has also provided Islamic banking software and training to them. 
PNM is now facing the challenge of fully commercializing its services with 
national outreach, after the government withdrew its regular budgetary 
allocations and turned PNM into a profit-making company relying on its own 
resources. Given its central bank origin, it may be instrumental in promoting 
mandatory auditing and setting up a financial authority for cooperative 
supervision. PNM needs financial and institutional strengthening. 
 
(5) In the reconstruction of tsunami-stricken Aceh, a pilot project of establishing 
a properly supervised system of Islamic cooperatives, to be backed up by Islamic 
cooperative rural banks, is being carried out. Donor support will expire in 2009, 
the official end of the reconstruction period. The reconstruction agency BRR 
estimates that there is a potential for up to 1000 Baitul Quirad in 335 subdistricts. 
Support is needed for (i) a self-sustaining structure of continued inputs beyond 
2009; (ii) expansion over all subdistricts with economic potential; (iii) action 
research in support of the process of building a comprehensive and sustainable 
Islamic cooperative sector in Aceh as a prime example of decentralizing 
regulation and supervision of non-bank microfinance institutions. 
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